Improving surgical recommendations with a little insight from behavioural economics
Can a better understanding of heuristics and biases enable us to avoid irrationality and improve clinical decision-making both for population healthcare and individual patients?
ReseaRch
PeerRev a quiet revolution is occurring in health sciences as long-term research and adequately powered placebo-controlled trials gain momentum and move us to question our faith in established operations. This movement is sometimes harnessed by clinical commissioning groups to restrict access to expensive but possibly futile treatments using the tool of value-based commissioning.
1 In orthopaedics, one-third of procedures are now on the list. Over one million surgical research papers have been published since 1980, yet pitifully few have covered the natural history of the relevant disease. One useful study is the Chingford series, in which 1,000 women were recruited for knee x-rays every five years. It has come as a surprise that structural progression of anteromedial osteoarthritis to the point that knee replacement is required occurs very slowly. 2 We have also learned that pain is usually self-limiting and should be treated conservatively rather than by arthroscopic debridement, which proves no better than placebo. 3, 4 Even the degenerative meniscal tears that are part of the natural history of the arthritis do not generally require arthroscopic partial meniscectomy.
5
These revelations are not confined to the knee; high-quality research on shoulder surgery for subacromial impingement has shown that 'no treatment' is as effective as surgical decompression.
6
The medical profession may protest about rationing when denied the opportunity to operate on their patients by commissioners but, beyond the rhetoric, there is an important debate to be had. The wisdom of complex decision making by doctors and other professionals has been seen in a new light following research by the 2017 Nobel Prize winning behavioural economist Richard Thaler. This paper is an attempt to nudge us towards better decision making by recognising potential errors, then offering some principles for managing populations as well as individual patients.
Thaler describes heuristics, which are cognitive shortcuts or rules of thumb that simplify decisions; they represent a process of substituting a difficult question with an easier one.
7 Seldom do professionals have the luxury of all the necessary information, nor sufficient time. These shortcuts raise the risk of five types of bias: anchoring, availability heuristics, representative heuristics, status quo bias and herd mentality. There is a sixth bias, which may be more familiar: 'conflicts of interest'. These can cause errors in our day to day clinical practice.
anchoring
Anchoring is a cognitive bias wherein one relies too heavily on one trait or piece of information. Surgeons will, for example, have very different experiences according to where they trained and the demographics of the local populations.
availability heuristic
A surgeon may be influenced by how easily a similar example of a patient's condition can be brought to mind.
Representativeness heuristic
The representativeness heuristic is where people judge the probability or frequency of a hypothesis by considering how much the hypothesis resembles the available data. An example would be perceiving meaningful patterns in information that is in fact random. orthopaedics' describes how surgeons are influenced by esteemed experts rather than by 'evidence-based orthopaedics' since so much of the literature is contradictory. Most conferences provide debates about treatment options for which the power of oratory may at times be more persuasive than the power of science. This does not necessarily mean that the treatment never works but it is simply not appropriate for that patient.
conflicts of interest
In addition to these heuristics and biases there is a sixth one: 'conflicts of interest'. Commissioners are funded by the central NHS executive and therefore need to restrict the limited NHS budget for the local population they serve, prioritising according to need. Their overriding concern is the population, however sympathetic they are to individual patients. Their credibility is damaged when true rationing is disguised by using inappropriate scientific references. Hospitals are responsible for the annual compliance with contracts including value-based commissioning, imposed by clinical commissioning groups and so they, too, have to prioritise the population rather than the individual. Trusts do not have sufficient alternative income to override value-based commissioning policies.
Surgeons are responsible for the individual patient and not for the population outside their practice, which invites the question: to whom are doctors accountable? Fitness for purpose describes the doctor's performance for their employer but it is their fitness to practise that describes their right to practise anywhere. Thus, the authority of the General Medical Council trumps that of their employer. Doctors 'have a responsibility to take all steps to alleviate pain and distress whether or not a cure may be possible'. Also, 'if a patient is at risk because of inadequate resources, policies or systems doctors must put the matter right if that is possible. Doctors must raise their concerns'. 8 It is therefore not surprising that doctors have a bias towards the interests of their individual patients; indeed, is it not a good thing? Professional bodies are dependent on their funding. It is not the public but the members who pay. Such groups need to recognise the possible influence of bias but nevertheless are frequently expected to publish treatment recommendations. Not surprisingly, guidelines differ according to their source; for example physiotherapists or surgeons compared with the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. Conflicts of interest are nigh on impossible to eradicate wholly.
hOW caN DecIsIONs Be IMPROVeD?
Should we not acknowledge these heuristics and biases and try to mitigate them? Sir Muir Gray has provided a rationale for considering both the benefits and harms of procedures for society and for individual patients. There will be little benefit to society when a procedure is first introduced.
7,9 Over time, PeerRev Figure 1 Benefits and harms of a procedure for a population (after Muir Gray). Figure 2 Benefits and harms of a procedure for a patient (after Muir Gray).
Surgeons are responsible for the individual patient
and not for the population outside their practice, which invites the question: to whom are doctors accountable?
as the procedure becomes more established, more patients benefit; for example thousands of patients avoid going blind due to intraocular implants, suffering from cardiac ischaemia due to coronary artery grafting or enduring painful immobility because of hip replacements. However, there is a limit to the benefit for society. This is illustrated in Figure 1 ; when all the patients who need the operation are treated, the graph will level out. The effect size of complications of surgery is also featured in Figure 1 as 'harms'. There are no invasive procedures without risk of harm. As the frequency of a procedure increases so there is a linear increase in harms. There is a point of optimality as illustrated in the benefits/harm curve. Economically, it is no longer sensible to invest more resources as the advantages to society are outweighed by the risks. This is where the Atlas of Variation is helpful. 10 The database compares rates of intervention between different care commissioning groups. In some areas there is overprovision and in others under provision. We could also follow Sir Muir's logic for individual patient decision making. Figure 2 shows how a procedure should be classified as necessary, appropriate, inappropriate or futile. The red line shows the minimal effect size of harms and the green line the effect size of benefits. The chances of unnecessary or futile surgery may rise dramatically if the patient has lesser disease and comorbidities such as ischaemic heart disease or obesity. Rationing occurs if surgeons are denied the opportunity to carry out procedures to the left of a vertical line between the 'appropriate' and 'inappropriate' indications.
There are other reasons to avoid unnecessary or futile surgery. Patients do not take kindly to a poor outcome. The annual NHS clinical negligence costs rose from £1 million in 1974/75 to £1,707.2 million in 2016/17. 11, 12 It is difficult to defend a claim when another expert argues that no surgery was necessary.
In conclusion, there is more work to be done as a professional group to acknowledge the heuristics and biases that can affect our decisions and to reassure the public. One practical solution could be for NHS trusts to match the commissioners with a value-based procedures policy. This policy would set out the principles described above to reassure the population and individual patients, acknowledging our recognition of heuristics and biases, emerging evidence, and showing how we recommend whether a procedure is necessary, appropriate, inappropriate or futile.
Harmony exists when both clinical and financial value coincide. Surely this an achievable goal?
